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Abstract
In this paper I compare John Locke’s and Murray N. Rothbard’s theories of prop-
erty.	The	main	aim	of	that	comparison	is	to	show	that	Locke’s	theory	of	property,	
which	seems	to	be	crucial	for	contemporary	libertarians,	cannot	be	the	foundation	
for the libertarian theory. The corollary is that Locke’s theory, resp. classical liberal-
ism, cannot be – as many, including M. N. Rothbard, the main proponent of libertar-
ianism, claim – the source of libertarianism in a strict sense.
Keywords: John Locke, Murray N. Rothbard, theory of property, foundations of 
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Resumen
En este trabajo se comparan las teorías de la propiedad de John Locke y de Mur-
ray N. Rothbard. El propósito principal de tal comparación es mostrar que la teoría 
de la propiedad de Locke, que parece ser crucial para los libertarios contemporáneos, 
no puede ser el fundamento de la teoría libertaria. Su corolario es que la teoría de 
Locke, esto es, el liberalismo clásico, no puede ser en sentido estricto –como muchos 
libertarios pretenden, incluyendo a M. N. Rothbard, su principal defensor– la fuente 
del libertarismo. 
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Many	who	are	concerned	with	libertarianism,	are	of	the	opinion	that	the	genesis	
of	this	political	theory	is	to	be	found	in	John	Locke’s	(1632-1704)	view	on	private	
property. They are of the opinion, therefore, that libertarianism is a radical version 
of classical liberalism.1	What	is	noteworthy,	is	that	this	view	was	maintained	even	
by	such	radical	contemporary	libertarians	as	Murray	N.	Rothbard	(1926-1995),	who	
includes Locke in the ranks of the libertarians, hailing him as “a great libertarian 
political theoretician”2	as	well	as	a	“classic	liberal	and	libertarian”.3
It	would	appear	however,	as	 I	will	attempt	 to	show,	 that	Rothbard’s	absolutist	
position	regarding	property,	as	well	as	his	view	on	the	role	of	the	state,	oblige	us	to	
review	our	concepts	concerning	the	genesis	of	libertarianism	and	prevent	us	from	
deriving libertarian roots of Locke’s theory.
The	fundamental	difference	between	these	two	positions	is	–	appearing	in	various	
aspects – their relation to property. Rothbard opts for an absolute right to property, 
whereas	Locke	sees	the	right	to	property	as	being	limited.	What	would	appear	at	first	
glance	to	be	only	a	difference	of	degree	between	Locke	and	Rothbard,	in	fact	has	a	
key	significance	and	consequences.
The	 limits	which	Locke	 puts	 upon	 the	 right	 to	 property	 have	 a	 variable	 charac-
ter,	however	they	are	dictated	by	the	principal	metaphysical,	or,	to	put	it	precisely,	
theological suppositions of the author of Two Treatises of Government. Rothbard’s 
theory is devoid of such suppositions.
1. The principal object of Locke’s considerations concerning the question of proper-
ty is land.4	Locke’s	position	regarding	the	ownership	of	land	however,	is	not	com-
1 Libertarianism as a version of classical liberalism is characterized, amongst others, by: S. Cox, 
“Albert Jay Nock: Prophet of libertarianism?”, in Liberty,	1992,	March,	vol.	5,	no.	4,	p.	41;	D.	Boaz	
(ed.), The Libertarian Reader,	New	York,	 Free	Press,	 1998,	 p.	 xiv;	D.	Rasmussen,	D.	 J.	Den	Uyl,	
Liberalism Defended: the Challenge of Post-Modernity, Cheltenham-Northampton,	Edward	Elgar	Pub,	
1997,	p.	2;	J.	Narveson,	Libertarian Idea, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1988, p. 8 (at the 
same	time	Narveson	leaves	 it	 to	researchers	 to	answer	 the	following	question:	“whether	Locke	gets	
us to libertarianism” – ibidem,	p.	175);	Ch.	M.	Sciabarra,	Total Freedom, Pennsylvania, Penn State 
University	Press,	2000,	p.	195;	M.	N.	Rothbard,	For A New Liberty. The Libertarian Manifesto,	New	
York, Collier Books, 1978, p. 2.
2 Idem, Economic Thought Before Adam Smith, CreateSpace, Auburn, 2006, vol. I, pp. 313, 472.
3 Ibidem,	 p.	 315.	 See	 also	 Rothbard’s	 review	 of	 Kendall’s	 book	 John Locke and the Doctrine of 
Majority Rule (Urbana 1941). See S. L. Richman, “Commentator on our Times: A Quest for the 
Historical Rothbard”, in Man, Economy, and Liberty. Essays in Honor of Murray N. Rothbard, Auburn, 
Ludwig	von	Mises	Institute,	1988,	p.	370	(May	16,	1961),	as	well	as	a	review	from	Richard	H.	Cox’s	
book Locke on War and Peace (Oxford 1960), see S. L. Richman, op. cit., p. 370, (June 22, 1962).
4	This	is	supposed	to	have	a	link	with	the	Whigs	landowning	character	of	property.	Frederick	Copleston	
observes	that	“it	is	more	to	the	point	if	attention	is	drawn	to	the	frequently	asserted	view	that	in	stressing	
so	much	the	right	of	private	property	Locke	was	expressing	the	mentality	of	the	Whig	landowners	who	
were	his	patrons”.	See	F.	Copleston,	History of Philosophy, London, Burns, Oates & Washbourne Ltd, 
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pletely	clear.	On	the	one	hand	he	affirms	that	God	as	the	Creator	of	man	has	rights	
over him, that is, since man has been created by God, he is God’s property – objects 
(including people) that are created belong to their Creator.5 The consequence of this 
thesis	would	be	per analogiam, the conclusion that man does not have a right to the 
land,	because	he	didn’t	create	 it.	This	argumentation	of	Locke’s,	dealing	with	 the	
right	to	property,	would	only	justify	a	right	to	those	things	which	(omitting	charity,	
inheritance,	being	in	a	state	of	need	or	being	concerned	with	taking	over	an	estate	as	
a	compensation	for	wrongs	rendered)	would	be	created	thanks	to	work	performed,	
and therefore not a right to the land, as given to man by God. The right to land, to-
gether	with	the	goods	found	on	it,	would	therefore	be	understood	to	be	the	right	to	
the	substance	of	the	land	itself,	and	therefore,	as	an	absolute	right	to	property,	which	
is	due	to	God	alone.	Man,	as	Locke	writes,	should	treat	the	world	as	a	foreign	coun-
try,	enjoying	and	taking	advantage	of	everything,	which	the	earth	has	to	offer,	but	at	
the	same	time	leaving	it	as	it	is	–	thinking	about	his	real	home,	which	awaits	him	at	
the end of his journey.6
It	would	appear	that	Locke,	at	the	same	time,	maintains	that	labor	constitutes	not	
only	a	title	to	ownership	of	the	fruits	of	the	earth,	but	also	of	the	very	earth	itself.	“As 
much Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, 
so much is his Property”.7	Therefore	it	seems	that	Locke	would	be	prone	to	admit	
that	property	applies	to	the	earth,	but	only	to	that	part	which	is	tilled.8
Hence	it	is	not	clear	whether	according	to	Locke,	man	is	only	a	leaseholder	(tenant)	
or	an	owner	of	 the	 land	which	he	cultivates.	A	solution	 to	 this	question	could	be	
found	in	the	recognition	that	man	is	at	the	same	time	a	tenant	and	owner,	the	former	
in	relation	to	God,	and	the	latter	in	relation	to	other	human	beings.	Simmons,	who	
opts	for	just	such	an	interpretation,	nevertheless	seems	to	treat	these	two	forms	of	
1959,	vol.	V,	p.	130.	Locke	himself	was	a	 landowner	and	invested	in	silk	 trade	and	the	slave	trade.	
The	worth	of	his	estate	at	his	death	was	about	₤	20.000.	See	M.	Cranston,	John Locke: a Biography, 
London–New	York,	Longmans,	1957,	pp.	114-115,	377,	448,	475,	quoted	in	C.	B.	Macpherson, The 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Hobbes to Locke, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970, 
p. 253.
5	„For	men	being	All	the	Workmanship	of	One	Omnipotent,	and	infinitely	wise	Maker;	All	the	Servants	
of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order and about his business, they are his Property, 
whose	Workamnship	 they	 are,	made	 to	 last	 during	 his,	 not	 one	 anothers	Pleasure”.	 J.	Locke,	 “The	
Second Treatise of Government”, in idem, Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett (ed.), Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004, par. 6, p. 271.
6	L.	P.	King	(ed.),	“The	Life	of	John	Locke	with	Extracts	from	his	Correspondence”,	in	Journals and 
Common-place books, London, Colburn and R. Bentley, 1830, vol. II, p. 92-94, quoted in J. Tully, 
Discourse on Property, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 72.
7 J. Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 32, p. 290. See also idem, “First Treatise of Government”, 
in idem, Two Treatises…, op. cit., par. 42, p. 170.
8 Wasted land thereby becomes common property. 
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ownership	on	an	equal	level,	not	calling	attention	to	the	fact	that	the	first	form	is	of	
cardinal importance and imposes on the character of the second form.9	Ownership	
in	relation	to	one’s	self	and	to	one’s	own	labor,	and	ipso facto to the earth, is limited 
due	to	the	relationship	with	God,	and	especially	with	His	order	to	preserve	one’s	self	
and	humanity	as	a	whole.	This	is	because	our	relation	to	God	is	primordial	regarding	
our	relationship	to	other	people,	the	manner	of	ownership	is	in	relation	to	God,	and	
the	resulting	consequences,	must	be	primordial	in	relation	to	ownership	regarding	
other people.10	The	result	of	all	 this,	 is	 that	man	is	not	 the	absolute	owner	of	 the	
earth, at most he is but an absolute tenant.
Not accepting this theological supposition, Rothbard, as oppossed to Locke, main-
tained	that	from	the	viewpoint	of	political	philosophy,	and	also	from	practice,	prop-
erty possesses only an earthly dimension,11 and that the earth „in its original state 
is	unused	and	unowned”.12 When taking command of it, an individual becomes its 
private	and	absolute	owner.	The	world	in	“earthly	conditions”	cannot	therefore	be-
long	to	everyone,	but	always	to	someone,	be	it	an	individual,	group	of	people,	or	in	
particular,	a	government.	Even	if	we	accept	the	fact	that	the	earth	is	God’s	property,	
then	–	as	Rothbard	asks	–	why	would	its	possession	in	common	by	everyone,	as	es-
poused by Locke, be more moral than its possession by individuals? This is because 
the right to property in earthly conditions is understood by Rothbard, as opposed to 
Locke, to be the right to the substance of a given thing, therefore to the earth and the 
crops	harvested	from	it,	belong	solely	to	their	owner.
2. The divine order and obligation to protect and propagate the human race obliges 
Locke	to	accept	the	possibility	of	a	(justified)	taking	advantage	of	another’s	(abun-
dant) property in life-threatening circumstances. According to Locke, that minimum 
which	 guarantees	 survival	 constitutes	 man’s	 general	 legitimation	 in	 the	 material	
sphere.	 If	 there	 is	an	 individual	who	is	 in	need,	 then	 the	 individual	right	 to	prop-
erty	of	others	will	be	superseded	by	 the	right	of	 that	 individual	 (in	need)	and	 the	
necessary goods crucial for his survival become his property.13 The right to private 
9 See A. J. Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 
263.
10 In addition, the case of property in the form of land is complicated by the appearance of a government. 
This	is	because,	as	Locke	writes:	“For	in	Governments	the	Laws	regulate	the	right	of	property,	and	the	
Possession of land is determined by positive constitutions”. See J. Locke, The Second Treatise.... op. 
cit., par. 52, p. 302.
11	From	the	viewpoint	of	political	philosophy	is	not	essential	if	order	which	is	discovered	by	reason	is	
a	work	of	God	or	not.	Suarez	for	example,	as	well	as	Grocius,	both	of	whom	are	quoted	by	Rothbard,	
affirmed	that	natural	law	is	binding	even	if	God	didn’t	exist.	See	F.	Suarez,	Tractatus de Legibus ac 
Deo Legislatore, lib. II, cap. VI, and H. Grotius, De Iure Belli Ac Pacis, quoted in M.N. Rothbard, The 
Ethics of Liberty, New	York,	New	York	Press,	1998,	p.	4.
12 M. N. Rothbard, For a New..., op. cit., p. 35.
13 J. Tully, op. cit., p. 132.
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property then is subjugated to the common good. Moreover, in the instance of not 
supplying	someone	in	need	with	that	which	is	necessary	for	his	survival,	the	owner	
of those goods may be subject to punishment.14 Those goods necessary for an indi-
vidual’s survival cannot be denied a person in need.15 Therefore the legitimation of 
the person in need constitutes an obligation for the person possessing those goods.16 
Charity, emphasizes Locke, “gives every Man a Title to so much out of another’s 
Plenty,	as	will	keep	him	from	extreme	want,	where	He	has	no	means	to	subsist	oth-
erwise”.17 The right to charity, understood to be the supplying of help to someone in 
need, therefore overrides the negative obligation of refraining from depriving some-
one	of	his	goods,	or	taking	advantage	of	someone’s	property	without	his	consent.18 
Therefore,	charity	in	Locke’s	opinion	is	not	an	extraordinary	obligation,	but	a	law	of	
nature.	A	person	who	is	not	charitable	is	therefore	not	only	someone	who	could	do	
something	more,	but	does	not,	but	he	is	also	someone	whose	behavior	breaks	natural	
law.
Locke’s consenting to taking advantage of someone else’s property by someone 
in	need	signifies	de facto limiting of private property itself.
These	conclusions	result	from	the	supposition	which	is	the	foundation	of	Locke’s	
concept	of	property,	which	 states	 that	property	does	not	 exist	without	 fulfilling	a	
public function.19	Such	an	interpretation	on	Locke’s	part	would	be	confirmed	by	the	
fact that – permitting an individual to appropriate an amount of land disproportionate 
to	his	needs	–	in	Locke’s	view	this	land	would	be	used	for	the	benefit	of	others.20
Macpherson,	 who	 presents	 Locke	 as	 being	 a	 proto-capitalist,	 argues	 with	 a	
pro-social	 interpretation	 of	 Locke’s	 theories,	maintaining	 that	work	 and	 property	
do not have to serve societal goals above all others.21 He claims that the emergence 
of money bears a primordial limitation (“enough and as good”) and he points to 
an appendix to Locke’s second edition of the The Second Treatise on Government 
citing	paragraph	37,	which	commences	with	the	words	“To	which	let	me	add	…”.22 
14 J. Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 37, p. 295.
15 Idem, The First Treatise..., op. cit., par. 42, p. 170.
16 J. Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 
217.
17 J. Locke, The First Treatise..., op. cit., par. 42, p. 170.
18 A. J. Simmons, op. cit., p. 345. Although certain declarations by Locke from the Essay on Tolerance 
and the Letter on Tolerance	may	attest	to	this,	their	author	does	not	see	anything	wrong	in	a	lack	of	
charity, since it does not “violate the rights of others”, and “shouldn’t be punished by the authorities”. 
This	position	however,	as	Simmons	affirms,	in	an	interpretation	of	other	texts	of	Locke,	is	not	confirmed,	
(Ibidem, pp. 343-345).
19 J. Tully, op. cit.,	p.	99	and	103;	see	also	J.	Waldron,	The Right to Private Property, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 137.
20  J Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 37, p. 294.
21 See C. B. Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 220-221.
22 J. Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., p. 294. See also C. B. Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 211-214.
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Macpherson	recognizes	that	an	increase	in	production	linked	with	an	appropriation	
of land disproportionate to one’s needs has to imply the distribution of its effects (e.g. 
of	the	products	of	the	land)	“amongst	those	who	don’t	own	any	land”.	Nevertheless,	
he does not perceive that this distribution may in the end take on a form, for exam-
ple,	which	is	 in	accordance	with	Rawls’	Difference	Principle.	Macpherson	opines	
thereby	that	those	who	are	not	able	to	expropriate	anything	for	themselves	will	have	
to	sell	their	labor	to	the	proto-capitalists	in	return	for	wages.	If	that	is	the	case,	we	
would	indeed	have	to	contend	with	a	proto-capitalist	system.	However,	as	The Sec-
ond Treatise on Government would	seem	to	indicate,	aid	intended	to	keep	someone	
alive	would	have	 to	be	 rendered	as	well	 to	 those	who	do	not	work.	This	collides	
with	Macpherson’s	comparison	of	Locke’s	society	to	a	commonwealth	composed	of	
shareholders	and	employees,	in	which	the	former	are	only	interested	in	maintaining	
the	latter	because	of	the	resulting	economic	profit.23 Macpherson completely over-
looks here the moral aspect of an obligation, that is maintaining one’s life and the 
lives	of	others,	which	constitutes,	according	to	Locke,	divine	design	in	relation	to	
man,	and,	as	it	would	appear,	reduces	Locke’s	understanding	of	“property”	to	one	of	
wealth.	Locke	however	understands	property	to	be	“life,	liberty,	and	wealth”.24
In	the	light	of	this	it	would	seem	that	private	property	cannot	serve	solely	to	meet	
one’s	own	 interests.	This	 is	not	 in	accordance	with	God’s	will	which	desires	 that	
every	individual	created	by	Him,	including	those	who	cannot	provide	the	means	for	
their	existence,	would	live	on.	Private	interests	also	might	not	be	made	compatible	
with	natural	 law,	 since	due	 to	 the	 limited	number	of	 resources,	 it’s	 impossible	 to	
meet the demands of everyone’s interests simultaneously.25
Rothbard,	as	opposed	to	Locke,	is	of	the	opinion	that	a	general	absolute	law	re-
garding the minimum amount of things needed to assure a man that he stays alive 
does not exist. Rothbard’s right to property in relation to material things is deduced 
from	the	right	to	self-property.	This	is	a	general	law,	but	it	does	not	entail	a	positive	
obligation	to	maintain	the	life	of	anyone	who	finds	himself	in	need.	Hence,	for	Roth-
bard, property in the form of the means of keeping someone alive, is not something 
which	belongs	to	everyone	“regardless	if	they	work	or	not”.	This	type	of	property	re-
sults	from	someone’s	putting	their	work	into	an	effort	to	achieve	something.	Locke’s	
view,	however,	allows	the	possibility	of	obtaining	a	title	to	something	without	put-
ting	any	work	into	it	(abstracting	of	course	from	instances	of	charity,	 inheritance,	
23 Ibidem, pp. 251-252.
24 J. Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 123, p. 350.
25 Idem,	 “Question:	 ‘Is	 each	 man’s	 private	 interest	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 law	 of	 nature?	Answer:	
No’	 (Essays	on	 the	Law	of	Nature,	No.	VIII,	1964)”,	 in	 idem, Political Writings, D. Wootton (ed.), 
Indianapolis,	Mentor,	1993,	p.	181.	The	self-interest,	as	Locke	emphasizes,	cannot	be	the	primary	law	
of	nature,	since	“if	it	were	the	case	all	the	noble	examples	of	virtue	ought	to	be	consigned	to	oblivion	
and	people	whom	we	now	admire	as	the	best	of	men	would	have	to	be	regarded	not	merely	foolish,	but	
as	wicked	and	evil”.	Ibidem, pp. 179-180.
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etc.).	At	the	end	of	paragraph	37	Locke	writes	that	someone	who	wastes	things		is	
“liable	 to	be	punished”	 since	 “(…)	he	offended	 the	 common	Law	of	Nature”26 – 
which	suggests	a	transgression	not	only	against	the	God’s	order	(here	Locke	could	
notabene use the term “sin”27), but also against the temporal order. This means that 
someone’s	right	to	wasted	things	which	were	created	earlier	has	been	abrogated.	A	
crime	has	therefore	been	committed,	for	which	some	type	of	punishment	must	be	
exacted.	At	another	point,	he	outright	affirms	„he	wasted	not	 the	common	Stock;	
destroyed no part of the portion of Goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing 
perished	uselessly	in	his	hands	[emph.	D.J.]”.28
3.	Locke	maintains	that	appropriation	is	just	if	it	leaves	the	other	person	with	a	suf-
ficient	amount	of	equally	good	resources	(enough and as good).29
The	condition	imposed	by	Locke	on	the	first	appropriation	was	supposed	to	pre-
vent	a	situation	whereby	it	does	not	deprive	others	of	property	or	waste	the	appropri-
ation	of	goods	to	the	detriment	of	their	own	interests.	If	such	a	situation	occurs,	that	
is	the	appropriation	of	goods	which	are	not	exhausted	by	their	owner,	they	become	
common	property.	Locke	provides	no	justification	for	prodigality	and	he	affirms	that	
if	 on	 somebody’s	ground	 the	grass	 rotted	or	 the	 fruit	 perished	without	gathering,	
“this	part	of	the	ground,	notwithstanding	his	inclosure,	was	still	to	be	looked	on	as	
waste,	and	might	be	 the	Possession	of	any	other”.30 Grunebaum is of the opinion 
that	there	is	nothing	wrong	in	an	appropriation	which,	on	the	one	hand	leads	to	prod-
igality,	but	on	the	other	hand	leaves	others	with	sufficiently	large	amount	of	goods	of	
the same quality.31	It	would	seem	then	that	the	ultimate	condition	of	appropriation	
is that it does not render harm unto others. In this instance, an appropriation that 
resulted	in	some	goods	being	wasted,	but	that	did	not	worsen	the	situation	of	others	
26 Idem, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., p. 295.
27 Idem, The First Treatise..., op. cit., par. 42, p. 170.
28 Idem, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 46, p. 300.
29	 Leaving	 others	with	 “enough	 and	 as	 good”	 cannot	 be	 understood	 to	 “leasing	 others	 a	 sufficient	
amount	of	land”,	but	leasing	others	in	a	situation	not	worse	than	which	they	had	before	the	appropriation.	
Let’s suppose that there are four persons, A, B, C, and D and a piece of land that comprises about 12 
hectares. If A	would	want	to	appropriate	a	part	of	this	land,	that	–	interpreting	Locke’s	condition	literally	
–	means	he	could	take	a	parcel	of	land	that	amounts	to	3	hectares,	then,	the	other	people	would	have	
the remaining 9 hectares to divide up amongst themselves. Let’s also suppose that A	would	be	able	to	
get	some	products	from	his	land,	which	only	be	enough	to	meet	the	needs	of	his	family.	Let’s	assume	
that B, C, and D	are	no	worse	off	than	before	A	appropriated	his	piece	of	land.	If	however	A	were	to	
appropriate	the	whole	12	hectares,	and	in	addition	would	get	enough	products	to	ensure	that	B,C, and D 
would	have	a	better	quality	of	life	than	if	A only appropriated 3 hectares, such an appropriation, on the 
basis	of	Locke’s	theory,	would	be	justified.	See	ibidem, par. 37, p. 294.
30 Ibidem, par. 38, p. 295. “Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others”. 
Ibidem, par. 31, p. 290.
31 See J. O. Grunebaum, Private Ownership, London-New	York,	Routledge	Kegan	&	Paul,	1987,	p.	63.
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would	not	be	evil.	However,	when	taking	Locke’s	supposition	into	consideration,	the	
question	arises	as	to	whether	man	is	not	also	responsible	before	God	for	using	those	
resources	which	were	granted	unto	him	by	Creator.	If	that	is	the	case,	and	it	would	
appear	that	such	an	interpretation	of	Locke’s	works	is	possible,	then	neither	the	cri-
terion	of	“enough	and	as	good”	nor	the	criterion	of	“not	harming	others”	would	be	
sufficient.	Therefore,	if	someone	were	to	undertake	the	“production”	of	fruit	on	land	
that	was	justly	appropriated,	and	the	taste	of	that	fruit	would	be	so	odd	that	he	would	
be	the	only	person	who	would	find	it	appealing,	and	the	land	would	only	be	suitable	
for the raising of this fruit, could one say that the surplus “production” of this fruit, 
which	would	be	subject	to	being	spoilt,	harms	someone	or	behaves	irrationally	and	
dishonestly, or rather that it is a sin against God? A partial response to this doubt may 
be	found	in	Locke’s	work,	at	the	end	of	paragraph	37,	when	he	speaks	of	waste	as	be-
ing	an	offence	“against	the	common	Law	of	Nature”.32 Wasting something is subject 
to punishment, since man, behaving in such a manner: “(…) invaded his Neighbor’s 
share, for he had no Right, father than his Use called for any of them, and they might 
serve to afford him Conveniencies of Life”.33 Locke supposes that the earth and its 
fruits	have	to	be	used	also	for	the	good	of	others,	and	the	moment	when	they	cease	
to	be	useful,	they	also	cease	to	–	by	very	definition	–	constitute	someone’s	(private)	
property	and	become	public	property.	One’s	own	interest	cannot	be	at	odds	with	the	
primordial	right	of	every	man	to	that	which	is	due	to	him,	regarding	his	survival	and	
comfort.	 It	would	appear	 that	one	could	propose	 the	following	hierarchical	order,	
which	reflects	Locke’s	intention	concerning	a	justified	appropriation.	Generally,	 it	
would	have	to	be	accepted,	that	via appropriation (assuming of course that the ac-
quired rights of others have not been previously violated) one has to pay heed to 
God’s	will,	which	has	made	man	a	rational	being	responsible	for	keeping	himself	
and	others	alive.	This	means,	first	of	all,	that	only	so	much	should	be	appropriated	as	
may	be	rationally	used.	If	as	a	result	of	this	appropriation	others	are	not	worse	off,	it	
is	justified	and	indefectible.	The	second	type	of	the	indefectibility	of	appropriation	
would	occur	when	an	individual	appropriates	more	than	he	can	use	(part	of	 these	
goods	will	be	wasted)	but	as	a	result	of	which	the	situation	of	others	is	not	wors-
ened. The third type of appropriation is the acceptance of someone else’s property 
and	 rationally	using	 these	 resources,	however	 this	 action	 leads	 to	a	worsening	of	
32 J. Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 37, p. 295.
33 Ibidem,	par.	37,	p.	295.	Locke	prohibits	the	wasting	(squandering)	of	things,	while	of	course	being	
conscious	of	 the	fact	 that	some	things	may	be	subject	 to	deterioration	without	any	fault	on	 the	part	
of	the	owner.	Locke	considers	squandering	to	include	the	failure	to	use	or	thoughtless	destruction	of	
something. See ibidem,	par.	46,	pp.	300-301.	Such	a	condition	of	wasting	goods	should	not	be	interpreted	
in a manner that every evident abuse of someone’s goods automatically makes them common property. 
Locke	 stresses	 that	 as	 long	 as	 goods	 are	not	wasted,	 they	 are	 someone’s	 property.	This	means	 that	
retrospectively	(after	some	goods	have	been	wasted)	one	could	pronounce	that	someone	did	not	have	a	
right to them. See J. Waldron, op. cit., p. 219.
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the	situation	of	others.	Finally,	the	fourth	and	worst	type	of	coming	into	possession	
of	something	would	be	an	appropriation	whereby	the	result	on	one	side	leads	to	the	
appropriated	goods	being	wasted,	and	additionally	to	a	worsening	of	the	situation	of	
others.
A certain vagueness results from the very formulation “enough and as good” 
itself.	Firstly,	in	a	society	with	a	large	number	of	people,	supplying	everyone	with	
a	sufficient	amount	of	equally	good	articles	could	lead	to	a	situation	in	which	more	
industrious	individuals	receive	proportionally	less	(goods)	and	this	in	turn	will	re-
flect	on	the	 life	of	society	as	a	whole.	It	 is	 therefore,	not	without	consequence,	 if	
these	resources	end	up	in	the	hands	of	someone	who	is	industrious	or	someone	who	
is	incompetent.	Second,	Locke	was	not	precise	as	to	what	type	of	people	he	had	in	
mind. Becker perceived this problem, and he opined that in a competitive situation, 
appropriation	of	the	land	brings	about	a	situation	where	some	people	do	not	obtain	
a	sufficient	amount	of	the	proper	resources.	He	therefore	proposes	that	Locke’s	con-
dition be extended to “at least major means of production”.34 As Becker explains 
Locke’s concept: “Land, other natural resources, and the major means of production 
(sources of energy, transportation, communication, heavy industry…) cannot be pri-
vately	owned.	If	they	are	acquired	privately,	they	either	deprive	others	of	opportuni-
ty, or put them at a competitive disadvantage. In either case the requirement that no 
one suffer loss by the producer’s acquisition of property is violated”.35 Such conse-
quences	to	which	Locke’s	theory	can	lead,	may	form,	as	Becker	put	it,	“foundations	
for socialism”.36
For Rothbard any type of limitation placed on property, and not resulting from the 
axiom	of	non-aggression,	is	unacceptable.	“It	is	difficult	to	see	–	writes	Rothbard	–	
why	newborn	Pakistani	baby	should	have	a	moral	claim	to	a	quotal	share	of	owner-
ship	of	a	piece	of	Iowa	land	that	someone	has	just	transformed	into	wheatfield	–	and	
vice	versa	of	course	of	Iowan	baby	and	Pakistani	farm.	Land	in	its	original	state	is	
unused	and	unowned”.37 Locke’s proviso,	which	limits	the	possibility	of	appropri-
ation,	leads,	in	Rothbard’s	opinion,	to	a	situation	where	any	type	of	appropriation	
would	have	to	be	preceded	by	a	calculation	concerning	the	situation	of	other	people,	
34 L. C. Becker, Property Rights, New	York,	Routledge	Kegan	&	Paul,	1983,	p.	43.
35 Ibidem, p. 43.
36 Ibidem, p. 43. Some contemporary libertarians place Locke’s concept of property on the left side of 
the political spectrum. Peter Vallentyne for example does this in Left Libertarianism and Its Critics: 
The Contemporary Debate,	(Palgrave	2000),	p.	1.	Barbara	H.	Fried	in	turn	writes	directly	about	leftist	
“Lockeism”.	 See	 B.	 H.	 Fried,	 “Left-Libertarianism:	A	 Review	 Essay”,	 in	 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs,	2004,	32/1,	p.	68.	John	Christman	argues	that	“when	distributive	considerations	are	introduced	
as constraints on the initial acts of acquisition, there are no good arguments against extending such 
considerations to all subsequent distributions…”. See J. Christman, The Myth of Property, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 66.
37 M. N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty..., op. cit., p. 42.
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resulting from such an act. First of all, this is, nevertheless, almost impossible in 
practice – this is because nobody is able to evaluate all the consequences linked 
with	the	appropriation	of	something,	and	secondly,	 it	 is	 theoretically	unjustified	–	
this	is	because	in	order	to	know	what	the	worsening	of	someone’s	situation	entails,	
we	would	have	to	revert	to	some	sort	of	value	system,	with	which	not	everyone	is	
obliged to completely agree.38 In addition – as Rothbard maintains, in concordance 
with	the	tradition	of	the	Austrian	School	of	Economics	–	value	is	a	correlate	of	the	
subjective	preferences	of	individuals,	so	that	any	comparison	with	subjective	utility	
is impossible.
The	difference,	in	the	question	of	a	just	appropriation	between	Locke	and	Roth-
bard,	is	expressed	in	Locke’s	supposition	that	only	permanent	work	on	the	appropri-
ated	land	maintains	some	type	of	property	title	in	relation	to	it	(the	land),	whereas	
Rothbard	is	of	the	opinion	that	the	primordial	act	of	linking	one’s	work	with	some-
thing	is	sufficient	to	obtain	that	thing	as	(one’s)	property	regardless	if	it	is	used	later	
or not.39
4. Locke accepts the labor concept of value, maintaining that labor constitutes a 
proportion of 9/10 of the value of anything.40 This theory is necessary for Locke to 
justify private property.
This	is	because	if	someone’s	effort	makes	a	change	in	the	world	for	the	better,	
that	person	has	a	right	to	those	things	which	he	extracted	from	their	natural	state.	
Locke	states	here	that	labor	and	the	effort	linked	with	it	constitute	a	necessary	but	
insufficient	condition	for	appropriation.	If	the	transformation	of	the	world	occurred	
in	contrary	proportions	(if	man’s	effort	would	be	only	1/10,	and	the	“rest	of	the	labor	
would	be	done	by	nature	itself”)	 it	would	be	difficult	 to	justify	private	appropria-
tion.	Locke	gradually	increased	this	proportion	to	the	benefit	of	labor	(99/100	and	
999/1000),41	 in	 order	 to	 acknowledge:	 “For	 whatever	Bread is more Worth than 
Acorns, Wine than Water, and Cloth or Silk than Leaves, Skins, or Moss, that is 
wholly	owing	to	labor	and	industry	[emph.	D.J.]”.42	It	appears	that	Locke,	however,	
38 For example, that life is the highest value.
39	One	could	object,	that	an	unused	watch	stashed	away	in	a	drawer	is	one	thing,	and	appropriated,	but	
currently	fallow	land,	is	another.	In	the	former	case,	the	fact	that	the	watch	is	not	on	the	market	doesn’t	
harm	the	situation	of	others,	whereas	the	lack	of	the	land	(on	the	market)	–	does.	Only	Locke	is	of	this	
opinion,	and	not	Rothbard,	who	states	that	land	which	is	justly	appropriated	in	a	just	manner,	does	not	
have any positive obligation in relation to others.
40 J. Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 40, p. 296. Rothbard ascribes to Locke not really 
labor theory of value but rather labor theory of the origin of property. See M. N. Rothbard, Economic 
Thought..., op. cit.,	t.	I,	pp.	57,	317).	It	would	seem	however,	that	in	Locke’s	conception,	labor	is	at	the	
same	time	the	source	of	property,	as	well	as	the	value	of	things.
41 J. Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 41, pp. 296-297, par. 43, p. 298.
42 Ibidem,	par.	42,	p.	297.	It	would	seem	that	these	examples	aren’t	sufficiently	well	chosen	by	Locke.	
In	this	specific	instance,	the	wine	and	bread	are	to	a	considerable	degree	labor	“performed	by	nature”.	
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was	not	completely	consistent	in	this	matter.	This	is	because	in	Some Considerations 
of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money he 
writes:	“The	Intrinsic	Natural	worth	of	Any	Thing	consists	in	this,	that	it	is	apt	to	
be serviceable to the Necessities or Conveniences of human life, and it is naturally 
more	worth,	as	the	Necessity	or	Convenience	it	supplies	is	greater”.43 He also adds 
that intrinsic value of things depends only on their usefulness to the human’s life,44 
however	“Being	of	Any	good	and	useful	quality	 in	anything,	neither	 increases	 its	
Price, nor indeed makes it have any Price at all”.45 On the one hand, the value of 
something depends, according to Locke, on the amount of labor put into it, and on 
the other hand – on the ability of a given thing to satisfy human needs. This second 
understanding could indicate a certain subjectivity – and therefore a compatibility 
–	with	Rothbard’s	concept	of	value,	if	not	for	the	fact	that	Locke	writes	explicitly	
about	 the	 “intrinsic	 value	of	 things”	which	 renders	 a	 consistent	 understanding	of	
value in subjective categories impossible.
In	as	much	as	Rothbard	was	able	to	admit	that	labor	constitutes	a	condition	of	ap-
propriation,	he	would	not	agree	with	the	affirmation	that	labor	constitutes	the	value	
of things.46 Classic theories of economics stated that the value of goods result from 
their	cost,	or	the	efforts	incurred	with	the	goal	of	obtaining	this	good	in	the	future.	
“On	the	contrary,	–	writes	Rothbard	–	 it	 is	clear	 that	value	can	be	conferred	on	a	
good only by individuals’ desires to use it directly in the present or in the present 
expectation of selling to such individuals in the future”.47 Thus, a man might buy a 
cake	and	find	that	he	does	not	like	it	at	all.	Ex ante the (expected) utility of the cake 
Locke	recognizes	that	there	is	a	difference	between	baking	bread	(a	number	of	people	are	engaged	in	
an activity) and gathering acorns from the ground. In the latter instance, the labor theory of value seems 
to apply to a lesser degree. Therefore, as Waldron remarks, paradoxically, there seems more room for 
complaint about the exclusive appropriation of acorns than about exclusive appropriation of land, on 
the Lockean Labour Theory. See J. Waldron, op. cit. p. 193.
43 J. Locke, Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the 
Value of Money, London 1692, p. 65, quoted in M. Grice-Hutchinson, Early Economic Thought in 
Spain, London, Routledge, 1978, p. 113-114.
44 J. Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 37, p. 294. Locke’s theory applies only to the use value 
of	a	given	thing,	and	not	to	its	exchange	value.	It	does	not	determine	therefore,	what	exchange	rate	it	
will	have	on	the	market,	that	if	it	will	have	a	proportional	character	or	not.	See	J.	Waldron,	op. cit., p. 
192.	Value	that	comes	from	9/10	of	the	work	put	into	taking	an	apple	from	a	tree,	and	the	value	coming	
from	9/10	of	the	work	put	into	building	a	house	are	not	the	same.
45 J. Locke, Some Considerations…, op. cit., p. 62, quoted in M. Grice-Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 114.
46	If	on	appropriated	land	I	raise	some	crops	which	nobody	wants	to	harvest,	then	these	crops	do	not	
have	any	value.	It	makes	no	difference	if	we	talk	about	the	use	value	or	the	exchange	value.	Wine	does	
not	have	any	use	value	(and	exchange	value)	because	of	the	person	who	produced	it	(if	that	wine	were	
to	contain	so	much	tannic	acid,	 that	 it	couldn’t	be	drunk,	 it	wouldn’t	possess	any	use	value),	 rather	
because	it	is	fit	for	use,	which	means	that	there	are	people	who	would	drink	it.
47 M. N. Rothbard, Man, Economy and the State, retrieved 7 June 2016 from: http://mises.org/rothbard/
mes/chap4b.asp#5D._Planning_Range_of_Choice.
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was	greater	than	the	marginal	utility	of	the	money	forgone	in	purchasing	it;	ex post 
he	finds	that	he	was	in	error	and	that	if	he	had	it	to	do	over	again,	he	would	not	have	
bought	the	cake.	The	purchase	was	the	consumer’s	responsibility	and	he	must	bear	
the	loss,	as	well	as	the	gain,	from	his	voluntary	trans	action.	Of	course,	no	one	can	
relive	the	past,	but	he	can	use	this	knowledge,	for	example,	to	avoid	purchasing	such	
a cake again. It should be obvious that the cake, once purchased, may have little or 
no value even though the man originally paid several grains of gold for it. The cost 
of	the	cake	was	the	forgone	marginal	utility	of	the	three	grains	of	gold	paid	for	it.	But	
this cost incurred in the past cannot confer any value on the cake now.48 According to 
Rothbard, the thing derives its value from its usefulness to satisfy one’s desires at the 
time.	If	the	value	of	the	things	would	be	determined	by	labor	inserted	in	it,	its	value	
would	have	to	be	the	same.	However,	the	value	is	variable,	since	the	same	thing	at	
different times may have different value for somebody.49
5.	Locke	writes	that	the	natural	freedom	of	man	denotes	his	being	free	“from	any	
Superior	Power	on	Earth,	and	not	to	be	under	the	Will	or	Legislative	Authority	of	
Man,	but	to	have	only	the	Law	of	Nature	for	his	Rule”.50 He thereby suggests the 
possibility of the existence of a stateless system. At the same time he adds that the 
will,	which	no	person	 should	be	 subject	 to,	 should	be	„inconstant,	uncertain,	un-
known	and	arbitrary”,	which	can	in	turn	lead	to	the	rather	Hayekian	idea	that	being	
subject	to	“constant,	certain,	known	and	non-arbitrary”	will	is	justified.51	It	would	
seem that this is exactly Locke’s intention.
In Locke’s opinion, the transition from a natural state to a social state, that is in 
which	a	government	exists,	takes	place	via a renunciation of natural rights regarding 
behavior and other rights, including the right to punishment, to the political authori-
ty.52	In	a	natural	state,	everyone	may	be	a	judge	in	his	own	case,	which	leads	to	unde-
48 Ibidem.
49 Ramon M. Lemos is of the opinion that Locke’s labor theory of value is not related to the economic 
dimension	of	things,	but	only	to	moral	and	religious	matters.	The	value	that	something	would	possess	
thanks	 to	 the	 labor	put	 into	 it,	would	 therefore	be	a	moral	resp. religious value. See R. M. Lemos, 
“Locke’s Theory of Property”, in R. Ashcraft (ed.), John Locke. Critical Assessments, London, 
Routlege,	 1995,	 p.	 347.	 Lemos’s	 interpretation	 refers	 only	 to	 what	 type	 of	 character	 the	 value	 of	
something	possesses,	which	was	acquired	thanks	to	the	labor	put	into	it.	The	character	of	this	value	is	
however	of	secondary	importance;	what	is	essential	is	that	according	to	Locke,	a	thing	obtains	value,	
thanks to the labor put into it.
50 J. Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 22, p. 283.
51 Ibidem, par. 22, p. 284. See also F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, Routledge, 1978, 
chap. 9: Coercion and the State, pp. 133-147.
52 The reason of men putting themselves into Society and quitting the State of Nature is to avoid the 
State of War. See J. Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 21, p. 282. Laslett argues that “The state 
of nature is already social and political. The state of society never completely transcends the state of 
nature: the contrast is never complete”. See P. Laslett, “Introduction”, in J. Locke, Two Treatises..., op. 
cit.,	p.	100.	Locke,	however,	allows	for	the	possibility	of	being	in	the	ordinary state of nature. These 
are	relationships	in	which	are	princes	and	rulers	of	independent	governments,	as	well	as	people	on	a	
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sirable consequences. In Tully’s initial interpretation, the natural principles and rules 
of	property	which	are	obligatory	in	a	natural	state,	have	to	be	replaced	in	a	civil	soci-
ety	by	positive	laws.	These	principles	however,	cannot	be	contrary	to	the	principles	
of	natural	law,	and	thereby	to	the	will	of	God.	This	is	because	entering	into	society	
is	signified	by	getting	rid	of	 the	natural	authority,	which	is	superseded	by	the	en-
forcement	of	laws,	however	this	does	not	signify	the	abandoning	of	rights	in	general.	
Locke argues, that in this instance, “Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the 
Inconveniences of the State of Nature…”.53 Not only legal questions, but also those 
concerning property, are found in civil society in the competence of the government. 
Positive	laws	enacted	in	a	civil	society	nevertheless	oblige	individuals	to	subordinate	
their	property	to	society	as	a	whole.	As	Locke	writes:	“For	in	Governments	the	Laws	
regulate the right of property, and the Possession of land is determined by positive 
constitutions”.54 The goal of society is, according to Locke, identical to the goal of 
people in a natural state, namely, the preservation of the human race. This is also the 
goal	of	a	government,	which	has	as	its	foundation	the	public	good	and	the	protec-
tion of property.55	Since	natural	law,	in	other	words	God’s	will,	is	also	obligatory	in	
the political sphere, one may conclude that a government should act in accordance 
with	God’s	will,	thereby	becoming	subservient	to	an	objective	criterion	as	to	what	
is morally good.56
Tully is of the opinion that in Locke’s conception, in spite of the fact that an 
individual	becomes	of	a	society	with	the	goal	of	preserving	his	property	(which	is	
threatened as a result of the appearance of money), one of the conditions of mem-
bership	(in	a	society)	is	the	individual’s	surrendering	his	natural	freedom,	which	is	
dependent on doing everything in order to maintain himself and others, and to guar-
antee for himself and others an appropriate comfort.57	The	individual	when	becom-
ing	a	member	of	society,	brings	his	property,	which	becomes	public	property	subject	
to conventional distribution.58 According to Tully, property in a society is treated 
entirely differently than in a natural state – it is something conventional and based 
desert island. See J. Locke, The Second Treatise..., op. cit., par. 14, pp. 276-277. The proper state of 
nature	means	that	“Men	living	together	according	to	reason,	without	a	common	Superior	on	Earth,	with	
Authority	to	judge	between	them…”.	Ibidem, par. 19, p. 280.
53 J. Locke, The Second Treatise…, op. cit., par. 13, p. 276.
54 Ibidem, par. 50, p. 302.
55 Ibidem, par.	138,	p.	360-361;	par.	239,	p.	425.
56 See J. Tully, op. cit., p. 101.
57 Ibidem, p. 164.
58 Ibidem,	p.	165.	Locke	writes	as	well:	“(…)	every	Man,	when	He,	at	first,	incorporates	himself	into	
any	Commonwealth,	he,	by	his	uniting	himself	thereunto,	annexed	also,	and	submits	to	the	Community	
those	Possessions,	which	he	has,	or	shall	acquire,	that	do	not	already	belong	to	any	other	Government”.	
J. Locke, The Second Treatise…, op. cit.,	par.	120,	p.	348.	Gerlad	A.	Cohen	polemicizes	with	Locke’s	
egalitarian interpretations. See G. A. Cohen, Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality, London, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995, chap. VII, pp. 165-194.
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on an agreement.59	He	goes	on	to	say	that	in	Locke’s	opinion,	a	moral	justification	of	
the form of property in a civic society is legally regulated by a change of the private 
ownership	in	a	natural	state.	The	task	of	legislature,	as	an	institution	invoked	by	the	
majority	of	society	is,	on	the	one	hand,	to	enforce	natural	law,	and	on	the	other	–	to	
regulate	property.	Regulating	property	has	 to	be	a	means	 to	 an	end,	which	 is	 the	
public	welfare,	that	is	to	preserve	the	human	race.	In	Tully’s	interpretation,	the	dis-
tribution of property in a civic society takes on a conventional character.60
A	key	moment	in	the	clarification	in	the	rise	of	a	society	and	government,	together	
with	their	respective	competences,	is	the	appearance	of	money.	Locke	is	convinced	
that the barter stage, characteristic of a natural state, does not generate a problem of 
inequality	(there	is	no	need	to	amass	beyond	that	which	is	one’s	an	essential	need).61 
The	problem	of	inequality	arises	at	the	moment	when	the	possibility	of	accumulating	
goods	is	more	than	what	is	essential.	This	possibility	creates	the	nondestructive	and	
incorruptible	coined	money.	The	problem	of	material	inequality	arises	together	with	
the appearance of coined money.62	Locke	justifies	the	appearance	of	money	as	the	
result of an accepted convention.63 Money in his opinion, arose on the basis of an 
agreement	in	a	pre-political	society	and	satisfies	the	unnatural	desire	to	amass	more	
goods than are absolutely necessary.64 This fact is at the same time a key element in 
linking	the	natural	state	with	a	civic	society.	Prior	to	the	discovery	of	money,	man	
worked	only	to	meet	his	needs.65 With the appearance of money, some people started 
to	till	more	land	than	was	necessary	to	meet	their	natural	needs,	which	led	to	inequal-
59 J. Locke, The Second Treatise …., op. cit.,	par.	38,	pp.	295-296;	par.	45,	p.	297.
60 J. Tully, op. cit., p. 164.
61 J. Locke, The Second Treatise…, op. cit.,		par.	36,	p.	292;	par,	48,	p.	301.
62	Tully	affirms	that	the	overriding	goal	of	the	chapter	on	property	in	The Second Treatise 
on Government	is	delineate	that	factor	which	would	motivate	people	to	seek	a	satisfactory	
defense in the form of an institution such as a government. This factor is supposed to be 
money. See J. Tully, op. cit.,	pp.	146-147.	The	“problem”	of	 inequality	of	wealth	appears	
where	we	have	to	deal	with	an	inequality	in	the	amount	and	quality	of	goods	possessed.	The	
appearance of money (coinage) is not essential here. We may observe that riches may be 
multiplied through the amassing of non-perishable goods and exchanging them for others. 
These	non-perishable	goods	will	of	course	fulfill	the	role	of	money,	not	being	however	money	
in the form of coinage. See J. Locke, The Second Treatise… op. cit., par. 46, p. 196. On the 
other	hand,	money	that	is	amassed	but	not	invested,	will	be	subject	over	time	to	devaluation,	
and	therefore	by	analogy,	subject	to	being	wasted.
63 Ibidem,	par.	36,	p.	293;	par.	47,	p.	300-301;	par.	50,	p.	301.
64 Ibidem,	par.	48,	p.	301.	Locke	argues	that	money	is	not	a	natural,	but	rather	an	artificial	good.	“For	
as	to	Money,	and	such	Riches	and	Treasure	taken	away,	these	are	none	of	Natures	Goods,	they	have	but	
Phanstastical imaginary value: Nature has put no such upon them…”. Ibidem, par. 184, p. 391.
65 Ibidem,	par.	48,	p.	301.	Locke	assumes	here	 the	 rationality	of	man,	who	knows	 that	 those	goods	
which	are	accumulated	above	that	which	is	necessary,	and	which	are	subject	to	destruction	(perishable),	
is irrational.
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ities in the amount of resources possessed.66 As a result of the appearance of money, 
things ceased to have value based solely on their usefulness, and acquired value by 
the appearance of their being able to be exchanged for money.67 Money acquired as a 
result of selling goods serving not only to meet current and essential needs, became 
the	cause	of	accumulating	goods	beyond	that	which	is	an	essential	need.	A	picture	
appears	in	Locke’s	argumentation	in	which	people	before	the	appearance	of	money	
were	only	motivated	to	meet	their	natural	needs	and	comforts;68 after the appearance 
of	money,	the	desire	to	possess	more	than	what	was	required	to	meet	natural	needs,	
became the main motivating factor. The appearance of money led to the abolition 
of natural limitations concerning the right to property.69 Hence this “monetarized” 
natural	state	led	to	inequalities	which	had	to	be	regulated	by	the	government	via the 
constituted	law.70
Waldron,	while	defending	Locke’s	interpretation,	at	the	same	time	rejects	Tully’s,	
and	affirms	in	turn	that	if	together	with	joining	society	there	would	be	a	change	in	
the	 status	 of	 laws	 from	natural	 to	 conventional,	 then	 any	 limitations	 imposed	 on	
the	government	would	not	have	any	binding	force;	the	government	would	cease	to	
be	linked	with	any	natural	law.71 Waldron proposes a solution that harkens back to 
Kant, saying that property rights are in a natural state, either temporary or transition-
al,	and	as	such	demand	confirmation	by	laws	constituted	in	a	civil	society.	However,	
such	 a	 ratification	 cannot	 lead	 to	 the	 nullification	 of	 these	 laws.72 Tully is of the 
opinion that in Locke’s concept, the government has a right to dispose of property 
acquired by individuals before they joined society. Waldron in turn, stresses that 
Locke’s	text	does	not	allow	such	an	interpretation.	First	of	all,	as	Waldron	suggests,	
those	excerpts	which	Tully	cites	cannot	be	interpreted	as	referring	to	property	rela-
tions	between	individuals	in	a	civic	society,	but	only	to	the	relation	between	civic	
66 Ibidem, par. 50, p. 302.
67 J. Tully, op. cit.,	p.	148;	J.	Locke,	The Second Treatise…, op. cit., par. 36-38, 40-41, 48-49.
68 Ibidem, par. 36, p. 292-293.
69 See C. B. Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 203-204.
70	Tully	is	of	the	opinion	that	in	Locke’s	view,	money	has	a	destructive	influence	on	man,	as	it	requires	
him	to	be	greedy.	Snyder	in	turn,	when	admitting	that	Tully	is	right,	says	that	money	in	Locke’s	theory	
fills	a	positive	role,	aids	–	as	a	factor	in	increasing	wealth	–	in	the	fulfillment	in	the	divine	obligation	
of	preserving	the	human	race.	See	D.	C.	Snyder,	“Locke	on	Natural	Law	and	Property	Rights”,	in	R.	
Ashcraft (ed.), op. cit., pp. 376-377.
71 J. Waldron, op. cit., p. 235.
72	Waldron	criticizes	Tully,	when	he	attributes	to	him	the	view	that	private	property	does	not	exist	in	a	
natural	state,	and	–	being	a	creation	of	civil	society	–	may	always	be	redistributed	with	regard	to	the	
public good. Waldron argues that “is not that the existence of private property serves the public good 
(though Locke certainly believed that), but rather that rights of private property are among the rights 
that	men	bring	with	them	into	political	society	and	for	whose	protection	political	society	is	set	up	(…)”;	
see ibidem, p. 137. It seems that Waldron didn’t interpret Tully’s thoughts on the subject precisely. This 
is	because	Tully	shows	that	as	in	a	natural	state,	common	goods	become	privatized,	and	then	–	as	a	
result of the appearance of money – private property is increased.
Dariusz Juruś Is Classical Liberalism the Source of Libertarianism?
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Políticas    
Vol. 19 Núm. 2 (2016): 437-458
452
society	and	that	which	is	outside	of	it.	Locke,	in	Waldron’s	opinion,	when	permitting	
an intervention of the government regarding property matters, has in mind only those 
resources,	which	have	not	been	appropriated	by	anyone,	and	enter	into,	or	also	may	
become	included	in,	the	boundaries	of	civic	society.	The	government	hence	would	
decide	here	about	property,	which	belongs	to	nobody,	and	not	about	that	property	
which	individuals	bring	with	them	when	they	join	civil	society.73 Waldon’s analysis 
does	not	provide	neither	the	factual	state,	finding	a	confirmation	in	Locke’s	text,	nor	
the intention and spirit of Locke’s concept of property. Locke, as Waldon himself 
confirms,	uses	 the	term	property	in	two	meanings:	a	narrow	one	referring	only	to	
possessions,	and	a	wider	one	including	also	the	concept	of	life	and	liberty.74 If there-
fore,	as	Locke	writes,	civic	society	arose	with	the	goal	of	defending	property,	that	is	
also	the	life	and	liberty	of	all	of	its	members,	that	means	that	linked	with	the	obliga-
tion	of	defending	the	human	race,	and	especially	in	a	situation	in	which	someone’s	
life	or	liberty	is	threatened,	the	property	of	others	may	be	sacrificed.	Let’s	suppose	
that	we	have	to	deal	with	a	situation	in	which	society	is	composed	of	ten	people,	
three	of	whom	join	it	with	a	significantly	greater	amount	of	property	(private	prop-
erty in a natural state) than the rest of them. Let’s assume that A, B, and C are very 
rich people, D, E, and F	are	moderately	well	off,	and	the	remaining	people	are	living	
on the borderline of poverty. Let’s assume further, that the land possessed by A, B, 
and C compose 75 per cent, and D, E, and F	25	per	cent	of	the	whole	area	occupied	
by society, and the rest of the people have nothing. Let’s suppose that this society 
would	appropriate	for	itself	an	area	of	1	per	cent	of	all	the	land	which	belonged	to	
it	previously.	According	to	Waldron’s	interpretation,	the	newly	created	government	
would	have	a	right	to	decide	what	would	happen	only	with	that	1	per	cent,	and	not	
take	into	consideration	the	disproportion	between	the	size	of	property	of	the	various	
members of society, rendering it impossible for some of them to have a decent stand-
ard	of	 living.	It	would	appear	however,	 that	 the	obligation	 imposed	by	God	upon	
man,	that	is	of	preserving	one’s	own	life	and	the	lives	of	others,	would	require	not	
only a distribution of this 1 per cent, but also of a part of the property belonging to 
A, B, and C, and perhaps D, E, and F.
A second counter-argument put forth against Tully’s interpretation harkens back 
to	the	terminology	employed	by	Locke.	In	Waldron’s	opinion,	Locke	never	writes	
about the fact that in societies, the government confers the right to property. He 
maintains	 that	 in	civilized	societies,	 the	possession	of	property	 is	only	“defined”,	
“regulated”	or	“established”	by	positive	law.75 Waldron’s thesis is supposed to con-
73 Ibidem, p. 236-237.
74 See J. Locke, The Second Treatise… op. cit., par. 87, pp. 323-324.
75 J. Waldron, op. cit.,	p.	238;	J.	Locke,	The Second Treatise…. op. cit.,	par.	30,	p.	289.	Locke	writes	
here:	 “the	 Civilized	 part	 of	Mankind	 (…)	 have	made	 and	multiplied	 positive	 Laws	 to	 determined 
Property (…)”.
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firm	Locke’s	opinion,	where	he	says	that	if	together	with	joining	society	individuals	
would	 lose	 the	right	 to	property,	 they	would	 lose	something	which	was	supposed	
to have been the goal of this action.76 Since Waldron argues that the basic right on 
which	Locke	founds	his	concept,	 is	 the	general right of every person to maintain 
his life, there is no need to have any conventional rights (that is those established by 
a government) in society to protect the poor from being taken advantage of by the 
rich,	as	Tully	certainly	would	want.77 According to Waldron, a positive right does not 
create	new	principles	or	authorization	in	the	question	of	property,	but	only	settles78 
rights	in	relation	to	property,	which	was	initiated	by	labor	and	industriousness.	This	
“settling” means, in Waldron’s opinion, the establishment of precise limits on prop-
erty,	a	system	of	titles	of	property	which	would	eliminate	unnecessary	discussions,	
as	well	 as	 create	 institutions	 (legal,	 executive,	 and	 administrative),	which	would	
have to settle problems related to property. Such a “regulation”,79	 which	 Locke	
writes	 about,	 does	 not	 have,	 in	Waldron’s	 opinion,	 a	 creative	 character,	 but	 only	
“regulates” the property of citizens.80	This	regulation,	as	Waldron	affirms,	does	not	
depend	on	confiscation	or	redistribution	to	which	the	government	does	not	have	a	
right.81	 In	order	 to	be	precise,	one	would	have	 to	affirm	that	Locke,	 in	paragraph	
139,	as	quoted	by	Waldron,	actually	prohibits	the	government	from	confiscating	the	
property	of	its	citizens,	but	not	from	redistribution.	He	writes:	“The	prince	or	senate,	
although	 they	are	supposed	 to	have	 the	authority	 to	create	 laws	and	 to	define	 the	
property of their subjects, can never have any authority to deprive their subjects of 
a	part	or	all	of	their	property	without	their	consent	[emph.	D.J.]”.82 Locke does not 
allow	the	appropriation	of	citizens’	property	without	their	approval,	but	he	does	not	
prohibit, at least not outright, the transfer of property from some citizens to others. 
In his Essay on Tolerance,	Locke	writes	about	this	explicitly:	“For	the	magistrate	
having	a	power	of	making	rules	of	transferring	properties	from	one	man	to	another	
may	establish	any,	so	they	be	universal,	equal,	and	without	violence,	and	suited	to	
the	interest	and	welfare	of	society	(…)”.83	Simmons	also	agrees	with	my	interpre-
76 J. Waldron, op. cit., p. 239. See also J. Locke, The Second Treatise… op. cit., par. 138, pp. 360-361.
77 J. Waldron, op. cit., p. 232-241. Locke seems not to be a defender of the poor or wage laborers. 
Firstly,	he	thinks	that	“most	so-called	poverty	was	more	the	result	of	idleness	and	corruption	than	a	real	
want”.	See	M.	Cranston,	John Locke: a Biography, pp. 424-425, quoted in J. Waldron, op. cit., p. 139. 
Secondly,	Locke	claims	that	members	of	the	laboring	class	are	in	too	low	a	position	to	be	capable	of	
rational life or act politically. See C. B. Macpherson, op. cit., p. 223, 230.
78 J. Locke, The Second Treatise… op. cit., par.	38,	p.	295;	par.	45,	p.	299.
79	 “The	 Prince	 or	 Senate,	 –	 writes	 Locke	 –	 however	 it	 may	 have	 power	 to	 make	 Laws	 for	 the	
r e gu l a t i n g 	of	Property	between	the	Subjects	one	amongst	another	(…)”.	Ibidem, par. 139, p. 361.
80	Locke	writes:	„(…)	by	Laws	within	themselves,	regulated	the	Properties	of	the	private	Men	of	their	
Society (…)”. Ibidem, par. 45, p. 299.
81 J. Waldron, op. cit., p. 234. See also J. Locke, The Second Treatise… op. cit.  par. 139, p. 361.
82 Ibidem, par. 139, p.361.
83 Idem, “An Essay Concerning Toleration”, in idem, Political Writings, op. cit.,	p.	196.	Laslett	who	
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tation	of	Locke’s	views,	when	he	affirms	that:	“When	the	large	appriopriations	of	
some deny to others independence and self-government, those appropriations are 
illegitimate;	governments	must	insure	that	remedies	are	available	(that	each	person	
has access to a living), either by returning some holdings to common or by requiring 
a restructuring of employment opportunities to guarantee a chance for each person to 
lead an independent, moderately (not necessarily equally) comfortable existence”.84 
Nozick	also	points	out,	when	citing	paragraphs	116,117,	and	120	from	the	Second 
Treatise on Government,	that	“Locke		shifts	illegitimately	from	someone’s	wanting	
society to secure and protect	 	his	property	to	his	allowing	it	complete	jurisdiction	
over	his	property	[emph.	D.J.]”.85 Locke indeed stresses that the authorities cannot 
deprive	anyone	of	his	earthly	possessions	and	bestow	them	upon	someone	else	for	
a	reason	which	has	nothing	to	do	with	civil	government.	If	however,	the	goal	of	the	
government is to maintain the members of society alive and to ensure their comfort, 
it	would	be	logical	to	present	the	conclusion	that	in	a	situation	when	it	is	impossible	
to	assure	some	citizens	the	means	to	a	comfortable	life	without	taking	advantage	of	
the private property of others (not just land), depriving the latter of a portion of their 
property is nothing bad, but rather outright required.
It therefore seems that the government in Locke’s concept has a greater task than 
just, as is traditionally attributed to it, to defend property. In his Letter on Tolerance 
we	may	read	that:	“The	commonwealth	seems	to	me	a	society	of	men	constituted	only	
for	the	procuring,	preserving,	and	advancing	of	their	own	civil	interests.	Civil	interest	
I	call	life,	liberty,	health,	and	indolency	of	body;	and	the	possession	of	outward	things,	
such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like”.86 What results is that if the 
state is to take care of the comfort of lives of its citizens, it has to provide necessary 
means for the comfortable subsistence so everyone is able to labor in, and enjoy the 
fruits of.87	It	would	also	seem	that	that	goal	would	be	attained	by	amongst	others:	“the	
increase of lands and the right employing of them is great art of government”.88 In a 
letter	to	Richard	King	dated	August	15,	1703	Locke	writes	that	the	government	should	
be	concerned	with	such	questions	as	war	and	peace,	trade,	employment	of	the	poor,	
and	anything	that	deals	with	the	management	of	public	goods.89 
Tully,	when	commenting	on	Locke’s	concept,	affirms	that	“government	is	obli-
gated to distribute to each member the civil rights to life, to the liberty of preserving 
analyses Treatises, observes that Locke never contradicts that assertion. See P. Laslett, Introduction, 
op. cit., p. 105.
84 A. J. Simmons, op. cit., p. 314.
85 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New	York,	Basic	Books,	1974,	p.	350,	footnote	9.
86 J. Locke, A Letter Concerning..., op. cit., p. 393.
87 J. Tully, op. cit., p. 169.
88 J. Locke, The Second Treatise… op. cit., par. 42, p. 288.
89 Idem, The Works of John Locke. A New Edition Corrected. In Ten Volumes, London, T. Tegg, 1823, 
(reprint by Scientia, 1963), pp. 308-309.
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himself and others, and to the requisite goods or ‘means of it’”.90	The	 following	
statement	 by	Locke	 confirms	Tully’s	 position:	 “everyone	must	 have	meat,	 drink,	
clothing,	and	firing,	so	much	goes	out	of	 the	stock	of	 the	kingdom,	whether	 they	
work	or	no.	(…)	the	true	and	proper	relief	of	the	poor:	it	consists	in	finding	work	for	
them, and taking care they do not live like drones upon labor of others”.91 If this pos-
tulate of Locke’s is to remain nothing more than a declaration, the solution, at least in 
theory,	would	have	to	be	some	sort	of	welfare	state.	Simmons	also	reached	a	similar	
conclusion	when	he	wrote:	“(…)	Locke’s	position	seems	to	require	some	form	of	
‘social	welfare’	program,	given	that	private	giving	is	likely	to	be	insufficient	to	the	
task and rights of ‘seizure’ for the poor invite chaos”.92	Grunebaum	also	agrees	with	
this	interpretation	when	he	says	if	we	accept	Locke’s	supposition,	which	states	that	
in	civil	society	the	“life,	liberty,	and	estate”	ought	to	be	protected,	we	can	argue	that	
“some	forms	of	socialism	protect	everyone’s	life,	liberty,	and	estate	where	estate	is	
appropriately	defined”.93	A	similar	view	may	be	found	in	Laslett,	who	writes	that	“if	
not complete communism, certainly redistributive taxation, perhaps nationalization 
could	be	justified	on	the	principles	we	have	discussed”.94
Regardless	of	which	of	these	interpretations	we	perceive	to	be	appropriate,	be	it	
Tully’s	conventionalist	or	Waldron’s	traditional	one,	in	each	of	these	instances	we	
have	to	contend	with	a	limited	right	to	property	in	a	civic	society.	Labor	and	indus-
triousness	do	not	constitute	–	regardless	of	the	social	consequences	–	a	sufficient	title	
to property in a political society.95
90 J. Tully, op. cit., p. 166.
91 J. Locke, “Draft of a Representation Containing a Scheme of Methods for the Employment of the 
Poor. Proposed by Mr Locke, the 26th October 1697”, in idem, Political Writings, op. cit., p. 452.
92 A. J. Simmons, op. cit.,	p.	333.	A	similar	view	is	also	exposed	by	Ingram,	when	he	writes	that	it	is	
difficult	to	reconcile	the	concept	of	self-possession	with	the	idea	of	the	welfare	state	in	the	mind	of	a	
libertarian, as opposed to an orthodox Lockian. See A. Ingram, A Political Theory of Rights, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 53.
93 See J. O. Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 68. Ramon M. Lemos also describes Locke’s position as being one 
of	“modest	socialism”	and	claims	that	his	very	conception	of	the	state	is	being	one	of	social	welfare	
capitalism. See “Locke’s Theory of Property”, in R. Ashcraft (ed.), op. cit., p. 344. Lemos considers 
that	the	progressive	income	tax,	minimum	wage,	or	unemployment	benefits	would	be	justified	on	the	
basis of Locke’s theory. Ibidem,	 p.	 353.	Any	kind	of	 reference	 to	 socialism	 in	Locke’s	 case	would	
be an exaggeration, but the limitations imposed by him on property could lead to a certain form of 
egalitarianism,	and	as	a	consequence,	to	a	welfare	state.	This	thesis	is	confirmed	by	Tully’s	position,	
when	he	affirms,	that	in	Locke’s	opinion,	the	manufacturer	does	not	have	a	right	to	the	complete	product	
of	his	work,	as	he	has	to	leave	a	sufficient	amount	of	things	which	are	“necessities	of	the	public”.	See	J.	
Tully, op. cit., p. 168. In this context, the comparison made by Barbara H. Fried of the limitations Locke 
imposed	on	the	right	to	property,	to	the	„Trojan	horse”	(in	relation	to	right-wing	libertarianism),	seems	
to	be	justified.	See	B.	H.	Fried, op. cit., p. 69.
94 P. Laslett, op. cit., p. 105.
95 A. J. Simmons, op. cit., p. 318.
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From	my	viewpoint,	each	of	these	interpretations	leads	to	the	same	thing	–	an	in-
dividual in a civic society does not possess an absolute right to property in relation to 
that	property	which	he	acquired	in	its	natural	state.	The	transformation	which	takes	
place,	together	with	the	creation	of	a	civil	society	by	individuals,	is	dependent	on	
the	fact	that	henceforth,	the	government	will	take	on	the	role	of	executor	of	natural	
law.	The	role	of	the	government	therefore	does	not	only	lead	to	a	defense	of	the	right	
to property, but to assuring all members of society adequate living conditions. In 
order to achieve this, the government should have control over all the property of its 
citizens,	which	does	not	mean	that	every	intervention	by	the	government	in	affairs	
concerning	property	is	justified.
The considerations presented here lead to an obvious conclusion, that Rothbard’s 
position, rejecting any type of limiting of property, and also the idea of a government 
(even	a	minimal	one)	and	Locke’s	position,	are	irreconcilable.	Their	views	on	the	
origin	of	government	also	separates	these	two	philosophers.
The	government	in	Locke’s	concept,	when	fulfilling	its	obligations,	simultane-
ously realizes the divine plan in relation to man. It’s not surprising therefore, that 
Locke	 attributes	 government	 with	 a	 divine	 character.	 	 	 “(…)	Therefore	 –	 writes	
Locke – God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and vio-
lence of Men”,96 and adds that one cannot claim that all Government in the World is 
the product only of Force and Violence”.97
The	divine	 origin	 of	 government	 does	 not	find	 any	 justification	 in	Rothbard’s	
concept,	as	he	accepts	Oppenheimer’s	thesis	which	says	that	state	governments	arose	
as a result of conquest, and violence is part of their nature.98 The victors instead of 
looting and murdering the conquered populace, extort constant tribute from them. 
The only goal of authority then is the economic exploitation of its subjects. Rothbard 
writes	 that	“the	State	 is	 that	organization	 in	society	which	attempts	 to	maintain	a	
monopoly	of	the	use	of	force	and	violence	in	a	given	territorial	area;	in	particular,	it	
is the only organization in society that obtains its revenue not by voluntary contribu-
tion or payment for services rendered but by coercion”.99 For Rothbard any type of 
„subjugation	to	the	government”	which	occurs	in	Locke’s	civil	society,	leads	sooner	
or later to a loss of property.
96 J. Locke, The Second Treatise… op. cit., par. 13, p. 276.
97 Ibidem,	par.	1,	p.	267-268.	In	another	place	he	also	writes	that	„Politic Societies all began from a 
voluntary Union, and the mutual agreement of Men freely acting in the choice of their Governors, and 
forms of Government”. Ibidem, par. 102, p. 335.
98 See M. N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty..., op. cit., 2006, p. 72.
99 Idem, “The Anatomy of the State”, in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays, 
Alabama,	Ludwig	von	Mises	Institute,	2000,	p.	57.
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Conclusions
This	comparison	of	 the	views	of	Locke	and	Rothbard,	principally	 in	reference	
to the question of property, did not aim to indicate one position as being superior to 
the other, but rather stressed their differences. Pointing out the essential differences, 
above all those concerning property, it supposed to have constituted an argument 
against,	the	almost	universally	accepted	thesis,	which	treats	libertarianism	as	a	con-
tinuation of classical liberalism.
Locke,	as	well	as	Rothbard,	are	of	 the	opinion	that	private	property	is	born	as	
a	result	of	labor	that	was	mixed	into	something,	but	only	Rothbard	affirms	that	the	
individual	who	comes	into	possession	of	something	in	an	industrious	manner,	has	an	
absolute right to it.
For Locke, private property is not something that an individual has a right to as 
a	result	of	nature,	but	only	something	which	he	has	a	right	due	to	the	labor	that	was	
required to obtain it. This right is not absolute, but rather a limited right to enable a 
person to keep himself and others alive.100 Although Locke treats original resources 
as common property, the individual’s property in relation to himself, enables him, 
through the property of labor performed, to take possession of these resources. Any 
limitations resulting from these theological principles of the author of Two Treatis-
es on Government,	placed	on	individual	private	property,	causes	it	to	lose	its	own,	
apparent, absolute character.101 Therefore, private property is no absolute in Locke’s 
opinion,	and	as	Ryan	writes,	“(…)	no	sort	of	absolute	ownership	is	involved	in	either	
life, liberty or goods…”.102 Tully also stresses that one of the obstacles to under-
standing Locke’s theory is his tendency to understand property to be a term signify-
ing	an	unconditional	right	to	land	and	equating	it	with	“private	property”.103 Locke’s 
position	that	fixed	property	in	land	does	not	have	a	natural	and	a fortiori absolute 
foundation, considers Tully as „Locke’s main ideological conclusion”.104 At the same 
time, he stresses that questions about property have to be, in Locke’s instance, con-
sidered in the context of positive obligations in relation to other and equal claims in 
relation	to	common	goods.	Property	is	founded	in	natural	law	only	when	it	is	under-
stood in this manner.105	Simmons	also	affirms	that	“it	is	clear	that	property	rights	in	
100 J. Locke, The First Treatise..., op. cit., par. 42, p. 170.
101 Macpherson opts for an absolutistic interpretation of Locke’s theory of property. Idem, op. cit., p. 
231.	He	however	does	not	find,	as	I	have	shown,	any	confirmation	of	this	view	in	Locke’s	texts.
102 A. Ryan, “Locke and Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie”, in R. Ashcraft (ed.), op. cit., p. 429.
103 J. Tully, op. cit., p. 124. As Tully notes, radicals at the beginning of the 19th century took advantage 
of even Locke’s theory in speeches against private property. Ibidem, C. H. Driver, “John Locke”, in F. J. 
C.	Hearnshaw,	The Social & Political Ideas of Some English Thinkers of the Augustan Age 1650-1750, 
London, George G. Harrap & Co, 1928, p. 91.
104 J. Tully, op. cit., p. 122.
105	The	supremacy	of	natural	law	causes	all	laws	to	become	a	means	to	this	end.
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Locke cannot amount to absolute rights over a thing, for Locke accepts many limits 
on our use of property”.106
All	 limitations	 result	 from	 a	 fundamental	 right,	which	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	 an	
obligation, imposed upon man by his Creator, to sustain life. Locke supposes that 
obligations	imposed	on	man	by	God	will	lead	on	the	one	hand	to	the	establishment	of	
a	government,	which	should	ameliorate	the	effects	of	human	greed	arising	from	the	
appearance of money, and on the other hand – to treat private property instrumental-
ly, as it should serve to maintain the maximum amount of people alive.107 
Inconsistencies	which	appear	between	Locke’s	and	Rothbard’s	concepts	of	prop-
erty,	which	Rothbard	himself	appears	to	trivialize,	have	however	–	as	we	have	tried	
to	show	–	a	more	fundamental	character.	It	would	therefore	appear	that	in	the	light	
of the presented argumentation, making Locke a precursor of libertarianism, in the 
strict	sense	of	the	word,	is	doubtful	at	best.
The	 conclusions	 which	 we	 reached	 after	 comparing	 Locke’s	 and	 Rothbard’s	
views	on	property,	also	have	considerable	importance	for	the	question	of	defining	
libertarianism	in	general.	If	Locke’s	position	is,	as	I	have	shown,	incompatible	with	
that	of	Rothbard’s,	 and	 therefore,	 in	universally	accepted	 terminology,	with	anar-
cho-capitalism, speaking about the classical-liberal roots of libertarianism and plac-
ing anarcho-capitalism, as is generally done, in its ranks, becomes quite problematic. 
In this situation, it’s necessary either to recognize Locke’s libertarian roots and limit 
it to minarchism,108	or	desirous	of	maintaining	anarcho-capitalism	within	the	bound-
aries of libertarianism, seek its other origins. 
106 A. J. Simmons, op. cit., p. 230.
107	As	Laslett	writes:	“In	some	way,	then,	it	is	through	the	theory	of	property	that	men	can	proceed	from	
the	abstract	world	of	Liberty	and	equality	based	on	their	relationship	with	God	and	natural	law,	to	the	
concrete	world	of	political	Liberty	guaranteed	by	political	arrangements”.	See	P.	Laslett,	Introduction, 
op. cit., p. 103.
108 A limiting	 of	 libertarianism	 to	 nothing	more	 than	minarchism	would	 be	 in	 accordance	with	 the	
universally accepted thesis, that libertarianism is a radical branch of classic liberalism. Radicalism in 
this	instance	would	be	understood	as	a	reduction	of	the	function	of	the	state	to	the	absolute	minimum	
necessary for it to operate.
